Entry Excerpt:

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy.

Topic include:

1) Why would ‘American officials’ expose their own intelligence source?

2) U.S.–India military cooperation: some rare good news in Asia.

Why would ‘American officials’ expose their own intelligence source?

On Oct. 27 the New York Times reported that Ahmed Wali Karzai, brother of President Hamid Karzai and a major power broker in Kandahar, was a paid intelligence asset of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Times’s sources for this allegation included “current and former American officials” including a former CIA officer and perhaps a senior U.S. military officer in Kabul. Ahmed Wali Karzai acknowledged aiding U.S. efforts but denied receiving any payments from the CIA.

The piece asserted that Karzai’s alleged connections to Afghanistan’s drug trade created deep frustrations with senior political and military officials in both the Obama and Bush administrations.

Did frustration and moral outrage with Karzai’s illicit activities lead U.S. officials to expose him as a paid CIA asset? It would certainly be understandable, for these officials may have a low opinion of him and perhaps by association his brother the president. But this collective outburst is folly and will make a nearly impossible task for the Americans in Afghanistan only that much harder to achieve.

The U.S. officials who exposed Karzai are likely hoping that with his status now public, he will no longer be useful to the CIA. Perhaps they are hoping that the CIA will be too embarrassed to continue paying him. As the New York Times piece discusses, some officials believe that if the U.S. really wants better governance in Afghanistan, it must begin by getting rid of types like him. They believe that for a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy to succeed, clean Afghan administration needs to occur concurrently, not later. By continuing to work with the president’s brother, the CIA was not cooperating with this view. Those objecting to the CIA’s alleged connection with Karzai appear to have used the New York Times in an attempt to resolve this interagency dispute.

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By Adam Brookes
BBC News, Washington

The camera shows a group of Afghan soldiers standing on a cold dusty plain, listening to an American instructor. He is showing them how to use a new American rifle.

In many Afghan units, the old AK47s are being thrown away now. The new Afghan army will have new weapons: refurbished M16s.

The new weapons may be more powerful. In a firefight, they may give Afghan troops an edge over insurgents who use Soviet-era AKs.

But the new rifles are also unfamiliar. They require more maintenance, more care.

“Nepotism in the army is probably one of the things that hurt them the most”
Lt Alan Campbell

The camera shows the Afghan soldiers hunched against the wind, as the instructor talks them through the basics of the M16 rifle, through a Dari interpreter.

The film I am watching was shot by an American lieutenant: Alan Campbell, a US Army reservist in his late twenties. He trained Afghan troops for nine months.

His video is instructive. It exudes a sense of the colossal task facing American trainers as they try to assemble a modern fighting force in Afghanistan, one that can tackle the Taliban, defend the central government, and – one day – allow US, British and other Nato troops to go home.

When I interview Alan Campbell, it sounds to me as if he found the young Afghan army troubled and unsure. He says corruption was a “serious problem”.

“Corruption was big: money, pay, accountability for soldiers, accountability for weapons, accountability for sensitive items, vehicles, fuel, ammunition,” he continues.

“In the big picture, that’s a big problem.”

US officers have told us privately of equipment issued to Afghan units disappearing and US troops finding it on sale in the local markets.

They also told us about Afghan army vehicles that appear to get two miles to the gallon of fuel.

“Either there’s a leak in the tank, or that gas is disappearing,” said one officer.

“There are pockets of brilliance and we need to expand that”

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As part of a push to create a cadre of muddy-boots diplomats ready to serve in conflict zones, the State Department is buying a fleet of fully armored vehicles — along with range of communications, first-aid gear and protective kit. The new equipment is supposed to help government civilians work where they are most needed: outside the protective bubble of the embassy.According to a recent post on Dipnote, the State Department’s official blog, the Civilian Response Corps — a newly created organization that has 50 active members, and another 200 on standby — will be receiving a fleet of 28 “fully armored vehicles” next year. “The vehicles will also be available for use by other U.S. Government employees supporting reconstruction and stabilization missions abroad,” the post says.

In addition, the Corps will receive additional gear to become more self-sufficient in the field: Medical kits, solar powered equipment rechargers, and office start-up kits. They will also have body armor, helmets and self-contained, solar-powered communications equipment packages to keep in touch with Foggy Bottom.

The Civilian Response Corps was created in response to the nation-building fiasco in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the U.S. military ended up shouldering much of the civilian reconstruction burden. Active personnel are trained to deploy within 48 hours; the standby corps is supposed to be available within 30 days. Civilian Response Corps members have served in Darfur and Colombia, although many have been tapped to fill billets on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) as well.

It’s particularly interesting to watch the development of the Civilian Response Corps amid the kefluffle over Matthew Hoh, the State Department employee who publicly resigned in protest over the Afghan war. Diplomats predictably wailed that Hoh was “not a real Foreign Service Officer” because he had a limited, non-career appointment: The U.S. government has been rushing to fill civilian billets in Afghanistan with temporary hires because the State Department and other U.S. government agencies are not “right sized” to support the civilian component in counterinsurgency.

A comment by a Washington Post reader serving on a PRT is instructive:

Matt is a ‘3161′ State Department employee, a special category of temporary appointments brought on for 12 month assignments in certain areas of expertise– engineering, ag, business, rule of law, etc. Some may sign on for a second 12-month tour.This is a very different thing than being an FSO– a commissioned, career diplomat who is a generalist and is appointed not as a result of an online job application and single interview (sometimes over the phone), but after a series of competitive oral, written, and physical exams. Referring to Matt as a “U.S. Official” is about as accurate as referring to a postal employee as a U.S. official. The commenter adds: “I am not trying to denigrate 3161s or postal employees!” Um, no, but you are betraying a very acute brand of snobbery.

U.S. Quietly Speeds Aid for Pakistani Drives on Taliban (International Herald Tribune): “The U.S. has rushed hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of arms, equipment and sensors to Pakistani forces for the campaigns in Swat and South Waziristan.”